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United States. The development of the use of contract-for-services mechanism in social service delivery 
in the 20th century is outlined as well as the increasingly interdependent relationship that exists between 
nonprofit social service organizations and the government. The contracting relationship itself is one that 
is inherently insecure, which is assumed to create competition and create an incentive for high 
performance. Evidence, however, indicates that competition is often less than vigorous in social service 
contracting. In addition, there is a growing consensus that trust is a central component to healthy and 
productive relationships. Individuals also each approach relationships with varied levels of trust. Based 
on Yamagishi and Yamagishi’s Trust Scales, it is argued that the sense of trust or sense of caution 
exhibited by a nonprofit vendor impacts their perception of the contracting relationship. The vendor’s trust 
orientation will likely push them to view their relationship in a way more likely to fit either with classic 
principal-agent theory or with stewardship theory, two theories often employed to explain aspects of the 
contracting relationship. This paper explores the interplay between trust and the realities of the 
contracting-for-services relationship; identifying key areas for future research efforts. 
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This paper discusses contract-for-services, the dominant mechanism of social service delivery in 
the United States.  The development of the use of contract-for-services mechanism in social 
service delivery in the 20
th
 century is outlined as well as the increasingly interdependent 
relationship that exists between nonprofit social service organizations and the government.   The 
contracting relationship itself is one that is inherently insecure, which is assumed to create 
competition and create an incentive for high performance.  Evidence, however, indicates that 
competition is often less than vigorous in social service contracting.  In addition, there is a 
growing consensus that trust is a central component to healthy and productive relationships.  
Individuals also each approach relationships with varied levels of trust.  Based on Yamagishi and 
Yamagishi’s Trust Scales, it is argued that the sense of trust or sense of caution exhibited by a 
nonprofit vendor impacts their perception of the contracting relationship.  The vendor’s trust 
orientation will likely push them to view their relationship in a way more likely to fit either with 
classic principal-agent theory or with stewardship theory, two theories often employed to explain 
aspects of the contracting relationship.  This paper explores the interplay between trust and the 
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Perceptions of the contract-for-services relationship: the impact of trust 
The response to meeting the needs of the poor and vulnerable people in the United States 
shifted in significant and fundamental ways during the twentieth century (Trattner, 1994; Van 
Slyke, 2003).  From a relatively localized, piecemeal response to a vast hierarchical government 
bureaucracy, the expansion of the welfare state was a significant social and historical 
development.  However, the last quarter of the century and into the 21
st
 century, a new way to 
deliver social services developed reflecting political, social and practical sentiments of the time.  
The relationship between governmental agencies and nonprofit organizations has become 
increasingly intertwined in this new form of social welfare service provision. Indeed, “Few 
facets of the American welfare state have been so thoroughly overlooked or so commonly 
misunderstood as the role of the nonprofit sector and the relationships between nonprofit 
organizations and government” (Salamon, 1995, p. 33).  The misunderstanding for most comes 
as a result of a complex and interdependent relationship most often called contract-for-services.   
 
Contract-for-Services and the Relationships that Emerge 
Contract-for-services has become the dominant mechanism of social service delivery 
(Milward and Provan, 2000; Salamon, 1995); within this relationship of contractor and vendor, 
the government’s role continues to shift in social services to that of contractor and supervisor, 
and away from direct service delivery.  In the arena of social services contracting the government 
agency—federal, state or local—contracts with the vendor—most usually a nonprofit 
organization (Van Slyke 2003) to provide social services.  There are also instances where other 
governmental or for-profit entities contract with a governmental agency to provide social 
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services, but the focus of this paper will study the relationship of the nonprofit vendor in the 
contracting relationship.   
The supporters of contracting out for services believe the private agency or nonprofit 
more capable to provide quality services efficiently and cost effectively than the government.  
The emergence of contract-for-services as a service delivery mechanism happened in tandem 
with decreasing trust in the government and a greater push to incorporate business strategies into 
government (Kettl, 2002).  “Whether the aim is to reduce government or just to make it work 
better, reformers from very different ideologies have settled on a competition description that 
substitutes market for government control, that replaces command-and-control authority with 
competition” (Kettl, 1993, p. 3).  Nonprofit organizations, rightly or wrongly perceived to be 
more trustworthy than government bureaucracy, are seen as the worthiest recipients of 
government contracts in social services. 
Scholars in public administration have raised numerous points of concern about the 
practical adequacy of the contract relationship in ensuring accountability and the provision of 
adequate and equitable services for all citizens.  Scholars have also argued that existing theories 
do not adequately account for the interdependent relationships that occur in contract-for-services 
(Milward and Provan, 2000; Salamon, 1995; Cooper, 2004; DeHoog, 1984; Kettl, 1993; Smith 
and Lipsky, 1993).  Others question the assumption that anything near true competition is 
achieved in most contract areas (Van Slyke, 2006; Kettl, 1993).  Salamon (1995) argues that part 
of the reason for the failure of traditional welfare state theory and narrative is that the theory fails 
to differentiate between the government as a provider of services and the government as a 
deliverer of services.  
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A central aspect of the contractor-vendor relationship drawing the attention of both 
practitioners and scholars is that of the relationship between and among individuals (acting as 
organizational representatives) and/or agencies (acting as if they were individuals) in the 
contracting relationship.  Questions about motivation, behavior and trust are inherent in all 
relationships and certainly appropriate to examine in the contracting relationship. Scholars test 
and question the adequacy of transactional explanations which center on an underlying 
assumption that relationships are based on a series of exchanges, all of which are decided upon 
in order to advance self-interest.  The conclusion many have come to is that a theory based on 
self-interest and transactions alone does not sufficiently explain all aspects of the contracting 
relationship (Van Slyke, 2006; Lambright, 2008; De Hoog, 1984).  Others maintain that the goals 
and interests of the contractor and vendor are not necessarily at odds.  Stewardship theory in 
particular provides a construct for exploring shared goals and more robust expressions of 
partnership in the contracting relationship (Van Slyke, 2006; Lamothe and Lamothe, 2011).  In 
addition, more recent literature discusses relational contracting which, similar to stewardship 
theory, focuses on aspects of the relationship that go beyond transaction.  Lamothe and Lamothe 
(2011) highlight the contrasting approach of transaction-based and relation-based contracting: 
“The contract between these two styles of governance is clear in that the former is 
founded on the assumption of an anonymous market and adversarial relationships among 
exchange partners, whereas the latter is built on the notion of the role of social 
institutions and willingness to cooperate among parties involved in economic 
transactions” (p. 868). 
In all human relationships, whether personal, professional or interorganizational, some elements 
are universal.  Most notably, in all relationships there must be an element of trust and stability or 
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security.  Both of these very basic instincts are not accounted for in transaction-based theories of 
the contracting relationship.  Stewardship theory and relational contracting theories help to 
account for such impulses which cannot be ignored if one is to fully understand the relationship 
between contractor and vendor.   
The structure of the contract-for-service relationship has a measure of inherent insecurity 
because the relationship is contingent and impermanent.  Outside of the general worries about 
funding cuts, there is always a possibility that the contract will not be renewed next time around.  
From a public choice or market perspective, the threat of the contract not being renewed will 
motivate the vendor organization to provide quality decisions and to perform well according to 
contractor expectations.  From a contractor perspective, this insecurity and contract renewal 
process ideally provides the contractor with a choice of vendors, all able and willing to perform 
the services, once given the contract.  The presupposition of adequate competition is not always 
present in all areas, especially more rural, less populated areas (Van Slyke, 2003; Van Slyke, 
2006).  Even in areas where there is a competitive presence, there are indications that both 
contractors and vendors seek to work to create stable and longer-term relationships (De Hoog, 
1984; Smith and Lipsky, 1993), and that reputation and prior history are determining factors in 
contract renewal and building trust (Lamothe and Lamothe, 2011; Van Slyke, 2006).   
The reasons for this behavior can be interpreted in various ways.  One interpretation 
intimates that the contractor and vendor work for secure and long-term relationships because it is 
in their best interest to do so.  The relationship that is created can be beneficial for both in terms 
of power, resources and other support (De Hoog, 1984).  Lamothe and Lamothe (2011), in their 
study of trust in local government-vendor relationships distinguish between this more 
transaction-based relationship view and a more a relational view.  A relational view of the 
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relationship centers on the impact that trust can play on the relationship between contract and 
vendor.  This interpretation also views the formation of stable, long-term relationships as 
beneficial to both contractor and vendor, but also emphasizes other socioemotional or 
psychological benefits (Lamothe and Lamothe, p. 868).  Whether viewing the contract-vendor 
relationship from a more transaction based or relational view, one can determine that there is a 
tension between the realities and tendencies inherent in the contracted relationship that do not 
match up with the theoretical market-based assumptions that undergird the contract-for-services 
mechanism (De Hoog, 1984).  
 
Issues of Trust and the Contract Relationship 
 Yamagishi and Yamagishi, in their theory of trust, discuss a tendency of human nature to 
seek commitment formation.  This activity seeks to increase security, but at the same time 
decreases opportunity costs (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994; Yamagishi, Cook and Watabe, 
1998).  These basic needs for security and stability also need to be met in organizational life 
(Oskarsson, Svensson and Oberg, 2009), and there are instincts towards commitment formation 
within the contracting relationship.  In relational contracting literature, the formation of long-
term contract relationships is a part of what is needed for trust and cooperation to develop 
(Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright, 2010).  The market mechanisms inherent in the contract-for-
services relationship do not acknowledge or support a need for security or stability.   
Leadership and organizational literature (Fairholm and Fairholm, 2000; Spath, Werrbach 
and Pine, 2008) stress the importance of trust in healthy and productive relationships.  
Relationships, no matter their institutional or organizational constraints, are still fundamentally 
relationships between people.  The constraints that are a part of the relationship impact the nature 
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of the relationship and the levels of trust, but it must not be dismissed that there is something 
very human occurring in the contracting relationship among the people themselves managing the 
contract as either contractor or vendor.  
In practice, nonprofit vendors and contractors engage in efforts to promote stability and 
build trust when the relationship is viewed positively.  Lamothe and Lamothe contribute very 
usefully to the literature in studying what matters in trust-formation by contractors in the contract 
relationship.  They suggest “The concept of trust (between contracting governments and their 
vendors) is rising in importance as one of the central tenets of this type of governance.  What is 
largely understudied in the midst of this increasing attention to the topic is identifying how and 
under what conditions trust if formed and sustained” (Lamothe and Lamothe, 2011, p.867). They 
also identify the need for further research to be done that examines determinants of trust of 
vendors towards contractors (p. 886).  Others have explored the perceptions of public managers 
contracting with nonprofits to perform social services (Van Slyke, 2006; Feeney and Smith, 
2008).   
However, the perspective and perception of nonprofit decision makers (vendors) engaged 
in contracting relationships with the government has not been a significant focus of current 
research.   One such condition that determines levels of trust is the propensity of the nonprofit 
vendor to trust. This paper will summarize the current literature and will propose a conceptual 
model of the relationship between an individual’s propensity to trust and their perception of the 




Development of contract-for-services in social welfare 
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 The US social welfare safety net is “diffused through every layer of government; partly 
public, partly private, partly mixed; incomplete and still not universal; defeating its own 
objectives, American welfare practice is incoherent and irrational” (Katz, 1986, p. ix).   As the 
‘contract for services’ mechanism of public-private partnerships in the delivery and provision of 
social services becomes ever more prominent, the nature of the social welfare safety net is 
fundamentally changed.  The safety net that, for a majority of the 20
th
 century, was dominated by 
the government’s central involvement is now even more so a reflection of what Katz describes in 
the earlier quote: a mixed, multi-level system that is not really much of a system at all.   
The relationship between the government and the contracted agencies is often 
misunderstood by the general public and even those who are a part of it and is fraught with 
complexity inherent in interdependent, decentralized relationships (Salamon, 1995).  Old models 
of bureaucratic management no longer jive with this new form of service delivery.  The tasks of 
the public administrator change markedly in situations where the government depends on various 
private organizations to deliver services and is responsible only for managing, monitoring and 
evaluating contract performance (Cooper, 2003).  All this is to suggest that the modus operandi 
of the social welfare system or network in the United States is still being determined as actors 
within and outside of the government respond to the changes to social service delivery. 
Traditional social welfare narratives focus mainly on the role of the government in 
meeting the needs of the vulnerable and hail the expansion and development of the 1930s to the 
1970s as positive and steps in the right direction towards a more civilized and compassionate 
society (Trattner, 1994; Jansson, 2009; Carlson-Thies, 2003).   Although the impulses for smaller 
and different forms of social welfare delivery have always been present, the 1980s and the 
Reagan Administration result in an emergence of these ideas to the forefront of the discussion. 
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Similar to the impact of the New Deal, the period beginning in the 1980s is a primary era of 
significant impact on the United States social welfare institution.  The perception at that time was 
of a social welfare system increasingly seen as over-generous, ineffective and inefficient, and 
primarily run by an intrusive federal government.  Some of the more progressive overtures 
characterized by New Public Administration  which argued for active advocacy for minority and 
oppressed people groups (Frederickson, 1971) were not met with support by all segments of 
society.  The government, once viewed as a problem solver during the Great Depression, was 
now viewed by many as an unnecessary and ineffective intrusion into the lives of many 
Americans often doing more harm than good in social welfare.  Indeed, even the perceptions of 
state administrators of state agencies receiving federal grants matched those of the general 
public.  By the 1970s, eighty percent of agency heads surveyed agreed with the intrusiveness of 
the federal government (Cho and Wright, 2007, p. 108).  President Reagan helped to generate 
and capitalize on the general sentiment with his stories of the manipulative, undeserving “welfare 
queen.”  The federal government and a hierarchical bureaucracy were seen as both ineffective 
and out of sync with the values of many of the American people.   
Traditional, progressive narratives mourn the coming of the 1980s and the conservative 
counterrevolution, considering it a serious setback in the progression of the evolutionary welfare 
state.  Critics question this narrative and the general perception held by many in the 1980s, 
arguing that the federal government was working alongside and through state and local 
governments and nonprofits well before the 1980s (Salamon, 1995; Cho and Wright, 2001).  A 
social welfare system built of local nonprofit organizations responding to their neighbors’ need is 
part of the American story made famous by de Tocqueville and continued on as part of what it 
means to be American.  This story of America conflicts with the modernist, progressive 
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paradigm which advocated for a responsive and equitable state solution to problems of poverty 
and inequality (Smith and Lipsky, 1993).  The history and development of the United States 
welfare state in the 20
th
 century highlights these competing stories of America’s relationship to 
its vulnerable people.   
Thus, when the Reagan administration set forth on a program that sought to significantly 
reduce welfare spending, it also altered the way in which funding was distributed. States were 
given greater control of spending and administering programs and were given block grants that 
allowed for greater flexibility and accountability in program administration and expenses 
(Schneider & Netting, 1999). This “new federalism” or “devolution” beginning in the 1980s 
continues to add nuance to the discussion about who is responsible for caring for the poor and 
vulnerable.  This policy era took direct aim at federal government involvement with social 
welfare, and profoundly weakened its direct role and its legitimacy in the governance of the new, 
emerging social welfare system. Even prior to the 1980s, others point out that scant attention was 
paid to the coinciding growth of the nonprofit sector provision of social welfare along with and 
alongside the growth of the federal government’s involvement (Salamon, 1995; Kettl, 1993; 
Smith and Lipsky, 1993).   
 Salamon (1995) delivers this assessment: 
“Between 1950 and 1980, a massive increase took place in the size and scope of 
America’s private nonprofit sector...By the late 1970s, in fact, the private nonprofit sector 
had become the principal vehicle for the delivery of government-financed human 
services, and government had, correspondingly, become the principal source of nonprofit 
human service agency finance” (p. 1).  
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What Salamon clearly marks in his assessment is not only a significant growth in the nonprofit 
sector, but an altering of the relationship between the government and private sector social 
welfare agencies.  Kettl (1988) attributes the growth of both sectors to the expanded role of 
government in society during the 20
th
 century.  “Such a large role, quite simply, is too big for any 
organization to handle on its own.  The growing use of proxies thus has been a natural reaction to 
the growth of government programs” (Kettl, 1988, p. 7).  Others suggest that this new form of 
government reflects of growing diversity and societal change, which has led to a more horizontal 
distribution of power among varied organizations (McGuire, 2006).   
Milward and Provan (2000) and others employ a certain metaphor for this newer form of 
government involvement--the hollow state.  The new role of the government has also been 
characterized by scholars as “government by proxy,” “third-party government,” or “indirect 
administration” (as cited by Kettl, 1998).  Kettl (1988) describes the phenomenon as 
“intermediaries responsible for actually producing the goods or services—in place of direct 
administration of programs by the government” (p. 4).  The major form of government by proxy 
is through contracting for services.  The state contracts with a nonprofit vendor to perform the 
social services that it often once had performed directly.  It is clear to see why contracting for 
services would appeal to cost-conscious policymakers as well as to proponents of innovation or 
localized solutions.  Kettle (1993) offers that “Whether the aim is to reduce government or just to 
make it work better, reformers from very different ideologies have settled on a competition 
description that substitutes market for government control, that replaces command-and-control 
authority with competition” (p. 3).   
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Contracting for services indicates an introduction of market principles into the social 
welfare system.   Milward and Provan provide a succinct summary of the development of this 
new form of government involvement in social welfare: 
“Command and control mechanisms associated with bureaucracy are being replaced by 
much more complicated relationships for the delivery of health and human services.  
Nonprofits, firms, and governments all play a role in the new world of devolved public 
policy.  This means that public services are jointly produced.” (Milward & Provan, 2000, 
p. 359)    
These complicated relationships and jointly produced services result in implications for 
management and performance that must be considered.  As part of this new reality regarding the 
nature and role of the government, new public management has attempted to redefine the 
definition of public administration to include not only the governmental bureaucracy but also a 
broad and varied group of institutions and organizations, with multiple and varied relationships, 
all of which have an impact on the work of public administration (Frederickson & Smith, 2003).  
The term “governance is a more inclusive term, concerned with creating the conditions for 
ordered rule and collective action, often including agents in the private and nonprofit sectors as 
well as within the public sector” (Milward & Provan, 2000, p. 360). 
The underlying assumptions in New Public Management (NPM) is that government is 
wasteful and inefficient, and that government should model and adopt management practices 
from the private sector.  The movement, emerging in the late 1970s throughout the 1990s was “a 
global phenomenon that emphasized deregulation, decentralization, downsizing, and outsourcing 
(as contracting came to be known) as key components” (Cooper, 2003, p. 45).  Osborne and 
Gaebler’s (1993) book Reinventing Government was profoundly influential in popularizing NPM 
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ideas, promoting a view of serving the “customers” of government, managing for results and 
performance-based management.  These reinvention models reflect the market-orientation of 
NPM (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011). The Clinton Administration, 
led by Vice President Al Gore, developed the National Performance Review to reinvent a 
government that “works better and costs less” (Cooper, 2003; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011; 
Kettl, 2000).  The core principles of NPM include: flexibility, decentralization, innovation and 
market-orientation, among other similarly-themed principals (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011, p. 
17-18). 
The NPM principles clearly indicate desire for greater flexibility and closer-to-the-ground 
management to help accomplish goals of efficiency and cost effectiveness.  The NPM 
movement, which was popular around the world, originating in New Zealand and Australia, also 
clearly reflects the general political sentiments of the 1980s and 1990s—government is the 
problem, not the solution.  The solution, then, is to reinvent government to adopt more business-
like practices.  Another contributing factor at this time is the realization that the centralized 
bureaucratic model embraced and assumed by public administration literature was no longer an 
accurate description of the way that the government is structured.  The change to the structure of 
the government required a change in understanding management and governance, and that 
change came first via bottom-up pragmatism.   Academics and intellectual justification for the 
changes came later (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011; Kettl, 2000).    
 The NPM movement, with its emphasis on management and effectiveness and efficiency, 
harkens back to early public administration days.  As Kettl and others point out, NPM emerged 
mainly from practitioners and managerial entrepreneurs.  Osborne and Gaebler were not 
academics, but a journalist and a city manager.  The academics who have advocated some of the 
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notions of NPM are less willing to adopt the idea that government become exactly like the 
private sector.  Some place NPM within a greater understanding of the changing nature of 
governance, a reflection of the increasing public-private partnerships that are part of the 
managerial landscape (Frederickson and Smith, 2000; Kettl, 2000).  This changing landscape 
requires different skills for managers.  Denhardt and Denhardt (2011) advocate for a slightly 
different variation that includes an organizing principle for NPM—they call it the New Public 
Service “A set of ideas about the role of public administration in the governance system that 
places public service, democratic governance, and civic engagement at the center” (p. 24).  
Overall, public administration scholars have been less likely to engage fully with all of the ideas 
promoted in NPM.   
 NPM shares some of the same values with early public administrators with its emphasis 
on efficiency and effectiveness, but pushes further for flexibility, innovation and a quicker 
response to the problems of the people.  The ability of a manager to do these things requires 
empowerment in the position to be able to create new programs and initiatives.  The enduring 
legacy of NPM principles is yet to be determined (Lynn, 1998), but the movement has forced 
further discussion and scholarship around the changing role of management and public 
administration as a field in a more decentralized and interdependent environment (Cooper, 2003; 
Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011; Kettl, 1988; Kettl, 1993; Kettl, 2000; Milward and Provan, 2000; 
Milward and Provan, 1998; Salamon, 1995; Saidel, 1991).  
 
Unique challenges in social services and the nonprofit sector 
 The increasing decentralization within government has had a special impact on social 
services.  “By the late 1970s, in fact, the private nonprofit sector had become the principal 
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vehicle for the delivery of government-financed human services, and government had, 
correspondingly, become the principal source of nonprofit human service agency finance” 
(Salamon, 1995, p. 1).  The relationship between social service and the public sector includes 
NPM-favored mechanisms like contracting out, of course, and performance-based measurement.   
The difficulty for social services in this context is in the nature of the work that it is 
tasked to perform.  First, the marketplace for available service providers can be less than robust.  
The contracts, then, may be arrived at by negotiation rather than competitive bidding, weakening 
one of the fundamental market principles in contracting (Van Slyke, 2006; Cooper, 2003). This 
reality of market imperfections increase the following: interdependence among contractors and 
vendors, boundaries between public and private continue to blur, the problem of absorbing 
uncertainties increases, contractors and vendors become coupled, conflicts of interest are 
inherent in the relationships, internal organizational cultures become more important than market 
incentives (Kettle, 1993, p. 179-197).  Clearly, the theoretical assumptions made in contract-for-
services do not hold up well when true competition cannot be achieved.   
There are also certainly ethical concerns related to the effects of contract continuation or 
disruption on already at-risk and vulnerable clients.  The clients have complicated problems and 
need varying levels of expertise and care; the policies and programs that guide social services 
can be ambiguous and even inconsistent.  Funding can be unstable (Van Slyke, 2006).  The goals 
or outcomes for social services are not as measurable as other types of government contracts 
where the contract depends on something tangible like a road project (Cooper, 2003; Kettl, 
1993).  Finally, normative concerns have been raised that question the appropriateness of 
contracted agencies representing the interests and actions of the state in social welfare (Smith 
and Lipsky, 1993); part of the misunderstanding that many feel when it comes to understanding 
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the social welfare system in the United States is in part due to the blurring of lines between 
public and private.  Not only is it a concern that that nonprofits act as representatives of the state, 
but there is also concern that nonprofits, as a mediating force between state and community, no 
longer can adequately represent the interests of the community and individuals to the state (Guo, 
2007).  An organization heavily dependent on government funding may be less likely to engage 
in basic advocacy or to pursue new programs that are outside of the interests of their primary 
funder.   
Accountability is more difficult to oversee in the contracting relationship and actions to 
sanction misbehavior or low performance comes in the way of not renewing contracts—a 
delayed action that only seeks to solve the problem for the future.  (Milward and Provan, 2000; 
Smith and Lipsky, 1993).  Accountability measures like contracts and legal sanctions are part of 
monitoring, but to assume these are the only forms of accountability available is too narrow a 
focus (Dicke and Ott, 1999).  Such concerns about the structure of contracting social service 
provision and the increasing interplay between public and private entities in the past half century 
ensure that this area remains ripe for further development of theory and further study of the 
impacts of contracts-for-services specifically and NPM more generally.  
 
Networking theory contributions  
In the past decade or more, numerous scholars contributed useful insights into the 
implications of social service contracting.  Some have successfully used networking theory to 
gain insight into the management implications and individual and organizational behaviors that 
occur in the contracting relationship (Milward et al., 2009; Milward and Provan, 1998; 
Lambright, Mischen, and Laramee, 2010, Johnston and Romzek, 2008).  Indeed, much insight 
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can be gained from looking at the contracting relationship through the theoretical lens of network 
theory.  The behaviors and actions that contractors and vendors engage in in part because of the 
nature of the relationship are helpfully explained using concepts of collaboration, communication 
and relationship building found in networking literature.  The term network refers to 
interconnected relationships, where power and resources are distributed and shared among 
multiple actors (Ansell, 2006).  Interdependence among organizations is a key function within a 
network and requires new tasks for managing the interdependent relationships (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 1999).   
The structural aspects of the contracting relationship lend itself well to being studied 
through a network framework.  The theory provides analysis of the structure and 
interdependence of the relationship.  It does not, however, yield insights into the individual 
motivations and attitudes of persons within the contracting relationship.  For that type of analysis 
scholars have turned to two key management theories: principal-agent theory and stewardship 
theory; both attempt to explain the behavior and actions of individuals within a relationship.  It is 
important to note that principal-agent and stewardship theory are not to be seen necessarily as 
two opposing theories, but perhaps are more appropriately seen as behaviors and characteristics 
along a continuum (Van Slyke, 1999; Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997).  Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson’s (1997) model of stewardship theory assumes that managers choose 
to behave as either a steward or and agent. However, this is an assumption, and the authors 
readily invite further research efforts to explore “the interactions among the psychological 
mechanisms and situational factors and the relationship between trust and risk that each party is 
willing to assume” (p. 43).  Exploring the nonprofit vendors’ perception of the relationship and 
the relationship to their propensity to trust will shed further light into relationship factors that 
Running head: PERCEPTIONS OF CONTRACT-FOR-SERVICES   18 
 
impact the contracting relationship.  Practically, both contracting agents and nonprofit 
organizations could use information on the impact of trust in the contracting relationship. 
 
Principal-agent theory  
 Principal-agent theory is a popular contemporary theory that is based on the assumption 
that individuals or firms are self-interested, self –seeking and will be behave in a way that 
maximizes benefits for one’s own interests.  This theory is based in economic analysis and 
assumptions found in rational choice theories (Frederickson and Smith, 2003, p. 37-39).  Two 
key assumptions in Principal-Agent Theory (sometimes called Agency Theory) is first, that there 
are conflicting goals between principal and agent (goal incongruence); secondly, “agents have 
more information than principals, which agents can exploit for self-gain rather than for the 
collective interests of the contracting parties leading to moral hazard problems” (Van Slyke, 
2006, p. 162).  In order to manage these assumed problems within the relationship, the principal-
agency theory suggests employment of incentive or sanctions to monitor efforts of the agent.  
The monitoring and creation of incentives in order to encourage good performance supports the 
principles in New Public Management.  The monitoring mechanisms attempt to solve 
accountability problems within the contracting relationship (Kettle, 1993, 2000; Van Slyke, 
2003; Lambright, 2008).  To summarize, two key tenets of principal-agent theory is goal 
incongruence, and the use of incentives and sanctions to motivate and monitor behaviors.   
 Principal-agent theory has been critiqued as not being able to account for all factors that 
influence managerial behaviors, especially in the contract-for-services relationships.  Van Slyke 
(2006) summarizes these criticisms well.  The first is a fundamental question about the 
orientation about what it means to be human in relationship with others.  The theory 
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characterizes people negatively, as self-seeking and focused on issues of wealth and power.  This 
focus ignores commitment to mission, pride and loyalty and other aspects of being human that 
have been shown to be important.  Second main criticism is that the theory does not account for 
the possibility of evolving behavior in the relationship as time goes by and trust is established.  
Van Slyke’s (2006) own work on this shows that the relationships evolve over time due to 
contextual factors.  A final criticism of agency theory is that “is an inappropriate framework for 
contractual services that are not easily measured or observed” (Van Slyke, 2006, p. 163).  The 
nature of social services contracts are more difficult to measure due to the nature of the tasks 
needing to be performed as discussed earlier.  Principal-agent theory continues to be widely used 
in order to understand how principals and agents behave in relation to one another and how they 
respond to various incentives.  The criticisms mentioned above have lead scholars, most notably 
David Van Slyke, to introduce the stewardship theory framework to help understand the 
contracting relationship.   
 
Stewardship theory 
Van Slyke, in his valuable work on the relationship between public and private 
organizations in social service contracting finds that there are elements of agency theory at play 
in contracting relationships but that over time the relationship evolves towards a principal-
steward relationship (Van Slyke , 2006).  The primary difference between principal-agent and 
stewardship theory is that the individual is not assumed to be self-interested, but rather is willing 
and able to identify with the interests of the organization.  The steward works for organizational 
success, rather than individual success—although sometimes these can be the same thing.  In 
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contracting relationships, goal alignment would be between the individual and the organization it 
represents and the goals of the contracting agency.   
“Empowering governance structures and mechanisms are appropriate” in stewardship 
relationships because the steward can be trusted to work towards accomplishing goals shared by 
the contracting agency and the nonprofit vendor (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997, p. 
27).  Instead of incentives or sanctions, which are extrinsic forms of motivation, Stewardship 
Theory focuses on intrinsic forms of motivation such as self-efficacy, self-determinism, and 
feelings of purpose.  “Trust relationships are central to instilling in followers a sense of personal 
capacity that is the essence of empowerment, and a part of a trust culture includes building 
ownership relationship” (Fairholm, 1994, p #).  Individuals should be given personal power, 
which is given in relationship with one another, and the individual should be given control to 
manage and meet challenges.  This involvement-oriented approach is seen to be especially 
beneficial in situations where there is instability (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997).  The 
control given to the individuals also encourages flexible, more accurate responses and a flattened 
hierarchy, which are important tenets of New Public Management (Block, 1993; Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992).   
These aspects of empowerment, along with goal alignment, are two key tenets of 
stewardship theory.  The comparisons between principal-agent and stewardship theory are 
inevitable, but scholars insist that these two theories do not necessarily stand in opposition to one 
another.  The following table provides description about some of the differences between the two 
theories:  
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[FIGURE 1.1]
Source:  Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson’s Comparison of Agency Theory and Stewardship 
Theory (1997). 
 
Both theories attempt to explain managerial motivation and behavior, and stewardship 
provides insight into complex relationships, deriving insights from psychological and 
sociological theories.  The psychological and sociological needs of the individual are 
foundational in the stewardship theory.  In Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson’s advocacy for a 
stewardship theory of management, they identify their assumption that individual’s choose to 
behave as either an agent or a steward.  There is some support that speaks to a psychological 
predisposition to behave one way over the other, while also recognizing that the situational 
factors are influential as well (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997; Lambright, 2008).   
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  Finally, trust is seen as central in both theories.  In Principal-Agent theory, trust is placed 
in the integrity of the contract, while in Stewardship Theory trust is between people in 
relationship with one another.  For the contracting relationship, then, building trust between the 
contracting agent and nonprofit manager would be expected to influence performance in a 
positive manner.   
 
Centrality of trust  
 Trust is a central component in any relationship.  “Trust is a risk relationship, but a 
necessary one.  When we trust another person it places us as some risk of loss of control” 
(Fairholm, 1994, p. 96). High trust cultures in organizations involve individuals choosing to 
follow the leadership, whereas “low trust cultures reduce the willingness of members to follow.  
Therefore, these low trust cultures necessitate use of control mechanisms” (p. 96). High trust 
cultures are characteristic of Stewardship relationships and the low trust cultures are more 
characteristic of the principal-agent approach of the contracting relationship.  Therefore, if an 
individual is more likely to trust, he or she is more likely to engage in stewardship behaviors and 
perceptions.  Indeed, if the individual perceives power asymmetries, there is a negative impact 
on the level of trust in the relationship (Oskarsson, Svensson, and Oberg, 2009).  Organizational 
and relationship constraints are also found to influence levels of trust (Oskarsson, Svensson, and 
Obert, 2009; Lambright , Mischen, and Laramee, 2009).  Indeed, trust is an essential part of 
relationship success and is especially important in relationships that function more as networks 
rather than hierarchically (Lambright, Mischen, and Laramee, 2009).  Given the decentralized 
and interdependent nature of the contracting relationship, it is important to recognize the integral 
role that trust must play in the contract relationship.   
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   Given the centrality of trust in relationships, more research is needed to understand where 
and in what conditions trust is built in the contracting relationship.  Research findings show that 
the length of relationship and other factors like reputation factor into the levels of trust built and 
the type of managerial behaviors one employs (Van Slyke, 2006; Lambright, Mischen, and 
Laramee, 2009; Lamothe and Lamothe, 2011).   
Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) and other related works on trust distinguish between 
the cognitive bias to trust or to be cautious, and separate this from the trust that is built over time 
due to interaction, information and reputation.  It should not be assumed that all individuals 
exhibit the same propensity towards trust.  With trust playing a central role in stewardship theory 
in particular, it is likely that a person more prone to trust would view the relationship through the 
stewardship lens, whereas a person more prone to a sense of caution (low trust) would be more 
likely to view the relationship to the more distrustful lens of the principal-agent theory.  
Although not all outside and contextual factors can be controlled for, it is worthwhile to explore 
how the propensity or bias to trust influences the relationship perception of the nonprofit 
manager. 
Conceptual Model 
 The following work will work to establish a conceptual model that can be tested in future 
research efforts.  As mentioned earlier, very little research has been done in gaining insight into 
nonprofit managers that are engaged in the contracting relationship.  Contracts-for-service 
relationships include many moving parts, one of which is the perception and approach that the 
nonprofit manager employs in the relationship.  The view of the manager, which is influenced by 
their natural inclination to trust or be more cautious, provides insight into which type of manager 
might be best suited for contract administration.  Especially in the contract-for-services 
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relationship which includes inherent insecurity the propensity of a nonprofit manager to trust or 
not could be impacting how the manager behaves within the organization and in dealings with 
the contracting agency.    
Scholars have already undertaken the task of outlining elements of what a contracting 
relationship can and should include when approaching the relationship from Stewarship and 
Principal-Agent approaches to these relationships.  Indeed, findings suggest that often there are 
elements of both depending on factors like length of relationship, reputation, etc.  (Lamothe and 
Lamothe, 2011; Lambright, 2008; Van Slyke, 2006).  Scant attention has been paid thus far on 
the impact of the individual nonprofit decision maker’s approach and perception of the contract 
relationship.  If the contract relationship is impacted by factors such as reputation and prior 
history, it stands to reason that the ability and willingness of the nonprofit manager to establish a 
positive and trusting relationship with the contracting agency would be of use to organizations 
seeking contracts. Indeed, the attention given to relational contracting also indicates a direction 
in the field to explore contracts that are based less on economic and transactional assumptions 
and focus more on elements of relationship building like trust and empowerment.   
 Given the importance of trust in relationships established by previous research, it is 
prudent to explore how and if the likeliness to trust impacts how a nonprofit decision maker 
views the relationship with the contractor.  Figure 1.1 displays a concept map of the hypothetical 
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The independent variable is the level of trust as determined by the Yamagishi and Yamigishi 
General Trust scale and the Trust scale (honesty and risk) by Yamigishi and Sato.  The 
dependent variables are goal alignment, empowerment, goal incongruence, incentives/sanctions, 
and general sense of relationship.   
Variable definitions 
The conceptual model variables have been developed from unique theoretical tenets from 
both theories.  The following table, from Van Slyke (1999), highlights how relationships are 




 Goal alignment is the extent to which the goals of the nonprofit and the contract match or 
are the same.  This can also include a sense by the nonprofit manager that the goals of the 
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contract are the goals which they strive to achieve, which is in line with the literature on 
Stewardship Theory (Block, 1993; Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997). 
Empowerment is defined as “the mindset that tells us that we have within ourselves the 
authority to act and to speak and to serve clients and those around us…that we have the right to 
define purpose…that we commit ourselves” (Block, 1993, p. 36) to the work at hand.   Davis, 
Schnoorman, and Donaldson (1997) discuss this also in terms of personal power.  The individual 
is trusted to be an expert in their position, and is given power to operate in such a way, within 
appropriate bounds.   
 Goal incongruence refers to the conflict of the contracting agency and the contract and 
the goals of the nonprofit manager and the organization. This variable is foundational to the self-
interest and self-seeking assumptions in Principal-Agent Theory; goal conflict is foundational to 
the theory that places the principal and agent at odds with one another.   
 Incentives and sanctions are extrinsic motivators that seek to control or monitor behavior 
and performance of the agent (nonprofit manager).  The incentives and sanctions are viewed as a 
form of control and assumes that the manager’s behavior can be manipulated and controlled 
through various behavioral interventions. 
 The general sense of relationship refers to the overall sense, positive or negative of the 
relationship, and the sense of stability or security that one has in the relationship.  The overall 
sense of the relationship is useful to know and understand when analyzing other variables as 
listed above.   
 Using this conceptual model as guide, two main hypotheses that can be tested in future 
research efforts: H1: Nonprofit vendor managers who report higher levels of general trust in 
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people will be more likely to interpret the contractor-vendor relationship through stewardship 
theory. Trust is a central component in stewardship theory; the participant identifies with the 
goals of the organization (or in this case the goals of the contract and contracting agency).  The 
identification of shared goals along with feeling empowered and trusted to do one’s job are 
essential elements of a trusting relationship.  Those more likely to trust and view the world from 
a posture of trust will be likely to extend this view same outlook to the contracting relationship.  
 Likewise, the nonprofit decision maker who views the world from a posture of caution 
and distrustfulness will carry this view to the contracting relationship: H2: Nonprofit vendor 
manager who report lower levels of trust/sense of caution will be more likely to interpret the 
contractor-vendor relationship through principal-agent theory.  The assumptions of traditional 
contracting theory with the emphasis on competition and performance more closely align with 
this second hypothesis.  The focus is on opportunity taking, seeking ways to continue the 
relationship, and working to advance the goals of the nonprofit organization.  These actions in 
and of themselves are not necessarily self-seeking behaviors but the role of the sense of 
partnership and trusting and being trusted is minimal in this theoretical approach.  Nonprofit 
decision makers that approach the world with a sense of caution are more likely to be averse to 
taking risks in relationships would be more likely to approach the relationship that aligns more 
closely with principal-agent characteristics.   
 Certainly, there are factors like time and reputation that influence the level of trust in a 
relationship (Van Slyke, 2006; Lamothe and Lamothe, 2011; Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 
1997b).  However, it still stands to predict that those who are more likely to trust will be more 
likely to report higher levels of trust towards the contractor and contract project of which they 
are a part.  It is outside the purview of this research project to be able identify all factors that 
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influence trust.  The focus here is on how a nonprofit manager’s propensity to trust influences 
their perception of the contract-for-services relationship and also to explore the usefulness of 
stewardship and principal-agent theory explanations of the relationship. 
Conclusion 
 Research efforts will be undertaken to examine the impact of trust on perceptions of the 
contracting relationship by nonprofit decision makers.  The research findings will be shared in 
academic and practice settings.  The results of this research will help Public Administration 
practice by contributing to a better understanding of the nature of contracting out relationships.  
The results may underscore the centrality of trust in relationships, and therefore will require the 
addition of trust variables into practical approach, application and understanding of the 
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